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УДК 323 
 
БЕЛАРУСЬ ПОСЛЕ ВЫБОРОВ: 
ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ИНТРИГА ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО ПРОЦЕССА 
 
Аннотация. Автор рассматривает основные векторы экономического и 
политического развития Беларуси после президентских выборов 2015 
года. Он полагает, что сложившаяся в стране экономическая модель 
сможет функционировать исключительно при поддержке России. 
Исходя из специфики историко-культурных условий Беларуси, в 
среднесрочной перспективе запрос на реформы может быть решен не 
по катастрофическому сценарию ее южного соседа.    
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 The original article in Russian together with its translation into English was first published 
on the website of the Russian International Affairs Council. The translation is published in 
edited version.   
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The recent presidential election in Belarus saw unusual uncertainty. It 
also uncharacteristically focused not on the political sphere, but almost 
entirely on the economic sector. Belarusians will not be shocked to learn 
the outcome of the election. The country expects changes in its economic 
policy after the election. 
 
Economy 
Belarusian liberals correctly argue that the current economic 
structure fails to ensure sustainable growth in prosperity, development, 
and protection from internal and external shocks. The Belarusian economy 
suffers not only from a range of challenges from Russia, but also has its 
own set of problems to deal with. The hypothetical solution offered both by 
members of the Belarusian Popular Front and by the relatively moderate 
opposition is quite simple: a guaranteed reduction in living standards for 
at least a decade for the sake of hypothetical growth, which at best will be 
enjoyed by the next generation.  
The mechanics that will enable the country to achieve this result are 
well-known to anyone who lived through the 1990s. First, such a plan 
would necessitate overwhelming privatization and bankruptcy of 
uncompetitive enterprises, i.e. virtually all large and medium-sized 
enterprises, except for oil refineries and Belaruskalii, according to liberal 
experts. Second, the state would need to discontinue targeted social 
support for the downsized workforce, as unemployment will reach at least 
30 percent of the labor market, and there will be no money to support non-
workers.1 Third, there would have to be liberalization of prices, trade, 
foreign exchange relations, and promotion of the financial market. Hikes in 
the price of goods by at least 250–300 percent should be expected. Fourth, 
budget cuts would be required, as well as an increase in the tax base amid 
higher tax rates and control of the budget deficit. Fifth, the state would 
have to reform land, forestry, and infrastructure markets, eliminating 
access to public resources. The above reforms would have to be combined 
with favored treatment for foreign investors, who would enjoy property 
rights protection. Public administration would be streamlined to comply 
with foreign objectives and interests. 
The logic of Belarusian reformers looks remarkably similar to the 
approach by Russian liberals back in 1992. However, it evolved at a 
different time, in different conditions, and amid the obvious achievements 
of Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and, most importantly, Belarus itself: 
“In the early 1990s, pseudo-liberals called for the state to leave the 
economy. Due to anti-popular privatization, this resulted in the 
appropriation of the mineral wealth of the country, its economic potential 
by a group of individuals who sought to take power in Russia. As a result, 
the Russian economy suffered greater losses in the 1990s than it did in 
World War Two” (Primakov 2012). The recipe concocted by Belarusian 
liberals will have the same economic results if the state follows their 
advice. For example, Iaroslav Romanchuk, a Belarusian economist and 
head of Mises Research Center, argues that the current employment 
                                                 
1 Hereinafter calculations by the author unless other references are provided. 
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structure cannot be preserved if the state aims to address productivity and 
efficiency challenges (Lavnikevich 2015). In 2013, however, organizations 
without state shareholding accounted for 49.5 percent of GDP, the same as 
the public sector. Further, in 2013 the private sector accounted for 58.4 
percent of Belarus’s exports and provided jobs for 49.4 percent of the 
country’s workforce (Rudyi 2015, 32). 
The openness of the Belarusian economy exacerbates structural 
problems amid the global crisis. Russia accounts for 48.8 percent of 
Belarus’s foreign trade. This would be sustainable if the Russian economy 
were growing at its 2012 rate. However, under the current circumstances 
two-way trade between Russia and Belarus cannot continue at this pace. 
That said, the overall crisis and sanctions bear responsibility for this 
situation, not the structure of the Eurasian Economic Union. The mere 
reference to Belarusian trade with Russia and Russian support does not 
provide concrete evidence as to the extent of this support. Indeed, it is less 
about support than it is about the model for engagement between the two 
countries, given that the level of socioeconomic development of one country 
depends on the development and capacity of the other country. This idea is 
shared not only by experts and economists, but also by senior executives 
in Belarus. Belarusian economists believe that a 1 percent contraction in 
Russia’s GDP results in 0.8 percent narrowing of Belarus’s GDP, although 
only accounts for the initial reaction. Given the time lag that spans roughly 
three quarters and the lack of any adjustment mechanisms at the current 
stage, a 0.8 percent reduction in GDP in Russia would potentially bring 
about a contraction in Belarus’s GDP by 1–1.2 percent. This tendency has 
been noted by the economy minister: “half of GDP depends on Russia, 
either directly or indirectly” (Snopkov 2014). 
 
Politics 
The crisis in the Belarusian economy encourages some representatives 
of the state authorities to look for external resources without sufficiently 
critical attention to the existing geopolitical and geoeconomic status of the 
country. The concept of an “equidistant” Belarus belongs to their arsenal. 
At the same time, the notion of an “integration of integrations” requires 
more clarification. This idea of an “integration of integrations” is 
remarkable from the perspective of Belarus and, admittedly, Russia and 
Kazakhstan as well. In short, this plan is not feasible. Minsk’s attempts to 
act as a buffer zone between Eurasian and European integration projects 
can hardly be implemented. There is no “integration of integrations;” there 
is a conflict of integrations instead. Some may object that the Russian 
president spoke about the “integration of integrations” in his recent 
speech, but let us have a closer look at his United Nations General 
Assembly speech: “Russia advocates harmonizing regional economic 
projects. I am referring to the so-called ‘integration of integrations’ based 
on universal and transparent rules of international trade. As an example, I 
would like to cite our plans to connect the Eurasian Economic Union with 
China's initiative for creating a Silk Road economic belt. We continue to 
see great promise in harmonizing integration vehicles between the 
Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union” (Putin 2015). In other 
words, integration of the Eurasian Economic Union and the European 
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Union is a matter of future. How distant is that future? It can be assumed 
that if the project depended entirely on Minsk or Moscow, the matter 
would be tackled within a few months. However, it depends on Brussels, 
meaning it is a matter of several years under a best-case scenario. 
Thus, turning Minsk into a negotiating venue for East and West, 
proposed by some Belarusian experts (Minsk Dialogue 2015), can be 
regarded as a possible agenda. The European Union envisages 
encouragement of Minsk for its special stance on the “Ukrainian issue.” 
However, it is more likely that the financial reward for Belarus’s role in the 
management of the peace process in Ukraine will come from Russia, not 
from Brussels. As a Russian–Finnish expert put it: “So far, the EU’s 
commendation of Minsk has had very few tangible results” (Moshes 2015, 
3). Further, some have claimed that “Belarus became the only country on 
the continent where the parties (including the self-proclaimed DPR and 
LPR) were able to meet on a regular basis. Minsk became synonymous with 
a ‘peaceful process.’ Certainly this had a positive impact on Belarus’s 
reputation and strengthened Belarus’s relationship with the West” 
(Shraibman 2015). The continent is huge, but Minsk is geographically well 
positioned for Moscow and Kiev, and treating this as a special geopolitical 
function is wishful thinking. 
In this context, the idea voiced by Belarusian experts that “Belarus 
should convert its relevance for the West and Russia in the Ukrainian 
issue into a technology breakthrough” (Shevtsov 2015) appears odd and 
utopian. Such a “conversion” is far from being properly implemented. 
According to the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR) the presidential election of October 11, 2015, made clear 
that Belarus still has a long way to go before it complies with the OSCE’s 
standards for democratic elections. The newly reelected Belarusian 
president made a fair comment about the election: “This election will 
become an improvement only if the West wants it. If the West is willing, 
then there is nothing that can stop it” (Lukashenko 2015). This point 
seems fair enough, but “willingness” is something the West lacks. Ahead of 
the election, Foreign Minister of Lithuania Linas Linkevičius said that he 
would welcome the lifting of sanctions on the Belarusian president by the 
European Union. This is as far as the resoluteness of European politicians 
extends. No one promises to change anything for the sake of Belarus itself. 
Under the circumstances, some members of the Belarusian expert 
community (e.g. Alekhnovich 2012; Starikov, Nosovich, Petrovskii 2015) 
increasingly believe that given Russia’s response to Ukraine’ turn towards 
the West, Russia would also readily destabilize Belarus if Minsk turned its 
back on Moscow. However, a closer look at such comments makes clear 
that these concerns are mostly voiced by Belarusians and Russians who 
live abroad. Notably, many experts who reside beyond the Union State [of 
Russia and Belarus] understand that Belarus cannot be defeated as long 
as it stays united, but if it is divided, this could perhaps happen.  
Belarus’s experience and its intellectual and manufacturing resources 
demand pragmatic, not utopian projects in line with the national spirit of 
peace-loving workers. Objectively, Belarus cannot become the assemblage 
point for the entire Eurasian space, but it remains an integral part, a 
central drive belt. The Minsk dialogue platform is important, but 
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situational. The Ukrainian crisis will eventually be resolved, and Belarus 
would be wise not to overuse the “Minsk dialogue” platform. The power of 
Belarusian state and society lies in its reliance on brotherly relations with 
Russia, work in the Eurasian Union and the SCO, and engagement in joint 
projects with Moscow and Beijing. 
The bottom line is that the Belarusian economic model, as currently 
exists, can only survive if Russia continues to offer support. A possible 
solution to the competitiveness challenge is a transfer from the paternalist, 
quasi-resource-based economic model to a postindustrial, investment-
based option. However, this path envisions tough unpopular reforms and 
shock therapy in the most cynical version of the twenty-first century. 
Unlike Belarusian liberal experts, this author is unwilling to impose such a 
model on Belarusian society and authorities. Given the country’s historical 
and cultural background, in the medium term, the demand for reform can 
be satisfied based on a scenario alternative to the catastrophic one 
adopted by Belarus’s southern neighbor. In today’s changing world, the 
relationship between Russia and Belarus as a link between two especially 
close and related nations remains constant. These two peoples share the 
same understanding of major historical events and vision for the future. 
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